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3. 
FOREWORD 
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to 
control damage from debris in the Shuttle operational 
environment and to make the control measures a part of routine 
launch flows. These measures include engineering surveillance 
during vehicle processing and closeout operations, facility 
and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and 
photographic analysis of mission events. 
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, 
on-orbit, and landing provide significant data in verifying 
proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In 
addition to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Photo/Video 
Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space 
Flight Center, and Rockwell International - Downey are also 
included in this document to provide an integrated assessment 
of the mission.
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Shuttle Mission STS-47 was launched at 10:23 a.m. Ija1 9/12/92 
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1.0 Summary 
The pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle 
was conducted on 11 September 1992. The detailed walkdown of 
Launch Pad 39B and MLP-2 also included the primary flight 
elements OV-105 Endeavour (2nd flight), ET-45 (LWT 38), and 
31053 SRB's. There were no vehicle or facility anomalies. 
The vehicle was cryoloaded for flight on 12 September 1992. 
There were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 
violations. There were no ice conditions outside of the estab-
lished data base. The External Tank exhibited light condensate 
on the TPS acreage. The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical leak sensor 
detected no significant hydrogen during the cryoload. No 
unusual vapors or cryogenic drips were visible during tanking, 
stable replenish, and launch. A 4-inch crack was present in the 
forward surface of the -Y ET/SRB vertical strut cable tray near 
the longeron closeout interface. There was no offset and no 
ice/frost in the crack. The crack occurred in an area where the 
stress relief cut had been eliminated by design at the 
factory. The condition was acceptable for launch per NSTS-08303 
and CR SO41254C. An IPR was taken against a 0.40L x 0.15W x 
0.0625D-inch dent, or cavity, on the inboard edge of Orbiter LH 
RCC panel #9. The IPR was dispositioned to fly-as-is. 
A debris inspection of Pad 393 was performed after launch. No 
flight hardware was found. EPON shim material on the south 
holddown posts was intact and bonded to the shoes. There was no 
visual indication of a stud hang-up on any of the south 
holddown posts. No frangible nut/ordnance fragments were found. 
The GH2 vent line had latched properly. Damage to the facility 
overall was minimal. 
A total of 137 film and video items were analyzed as part of 
the post launch data review. No major vehicle damage or lost 
flight hardware was observed that would have affected the 
mission. No ordnance debris fell from any of the HDP DCS/stud 
holes. Al]. T-0 umbilicals operated properly. On-orbit imagery 
revealed nine divots in the ET LH2 tank-to-intertank flange 
closeout, 2 divots in the LH2 tank acreage, some TPS damage to 
the L02 ET/ORB umbilical and cable tray, and one 14-16 inch 
divot in the intertarik acreage between the bipods. The divot in 
the intertank acreage had the greatest potential threat to 
Orbiter tiles and was taken as an IFA. A copper-colored object 
drifted away from the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical after ET separation 
from the Orbiter. The origin of the object, a washer or spacer, 
has not been determined. Orbiter performance, landing gear 
extension, wheel touchdown, and vehicle rollout after landing 
were normal. A 2-4 knot crosswind blew the drag chute eastward 
relative to the Orbiter and caused the nose to yaw left 
(westward). Active steering and braking was required to bring 
the vehicle back on runway center line. Since this was an unex-
pected controllability concern, an IFA was taken. 
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The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after 
retrieval. The RB frustum had 42 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners 
and one 2-inch diameter area of missing TPS on the -Y axis at 
the 275 ring frame. The LH frustum had 25 MSA-2 debonds over 
fasteners and was missing MSA-2 (1.5-inch diameter) from one 
location between the +Y and +Z axes'on the 381 ring frame. A 6" 
x 3" piece of K5NA was missing from the aft stiffener ring. 
Though the remaining material showed signs of delamination, the 
surfaces were not sooted indicating the material was most 
likely lost at water impact. All Debris Containment System 
(DCS) plungers were seated properly. Pieces of EPON shim were 
missing from HDP #4 and HDP V. The material was lost prior to 
water impact and exhibited a sooted/charred substrate. 
A detailed post landing inspection of OV-105 (Endeavour) was 
conducted on 20 September 1992. The Orbiter TPS sustained a 
total of 108 hits, of which 11 had a major dimension of one 
inch or greater. The Orbiter lower surface had a total of 47 
hits, of which 3 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. 
Based on these numbers and comparison to statistics from previ-
ous missions of similar configuration, both the total number of 
Orbiter TPS debris hits and the number of hits one inch or 
larger were less than average. The EO-3 (L02) ET/Orbiter 
separation device plunger was obstructed by two ordnance 
fragments and did not seat properly. The EO-]. and EO-2 separa-
tion devices appeared to have functioned properly. No flight 
hardware was found on the runway below the umbilicals when the 
ET doors were opened. 
This flight marked the third use of the Orbiter drag chute. The 
drag chute appeared to have functioned nominally. However, 
three tiles on the Lii edge of the vertical stabilizer "stinger" 
suffered significant damage/material loss due to contact with 
the riSer lines during chute deployment. Another tile, on the 
lower (-Z) RH edge of the drag chute opening, was slightly 
damaged by separation of the chute compartment door. All drag 
chute hardware was recovered and showed no signs of abnormal 
operation. 
A variety of residuals were present in the Orbiter window 
samples and indicated sources such as Orbiter TPS, SRB BSM 
exhaust residue, natural landing site products, organics, and 
paint. Results of residual data do not indicate a single source 
of damaging debris as all of the materials have been noted 
previously in post-landing sample reports. These residual 
sample data also gave no indication of debris trends when 
compared to data from previous missions. 
A total of eleven Post Launch Anomalies, including two IFA 
candidates, were observed during this mission assessment. 
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2.0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING 
The Ice/Debris/TPS/Photographjc Analysis Team briefing for 
launch activities was conducted on 11 September 1992 at 0830 
hours with the following key personnel present: 
S. Higginbotham NASA - KSC STI, Ice/Debris Assessment 
B. Davis NASA - KSC STI, Ice/Debris Assessment 
G. Katnik NASA - KSC Lead, Ice/Debris/Photo Team 
B. Speece NASA - KSC Lead, ET Thermal Protection 
B. Bowen NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
K. Tenbusch NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
P. Rosado NASA - KSC Chief, ET Mechanical Systems 
J. Rivera NASA - KSC Lead, ET Structures 
M. Bassignani NASA - KSC ET Processing, Debris Assess 
A. Oliu NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
R. Seale LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
M. Jaime LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
Z. Byrns NASA - JSC Level II Integration 
S. Copsey MMC	 - MAF ET TPS Testing/Certif 
J. Stone RI	 - DNY Debris Assess, LVL II Integ 
K. Mayer RI	 - LSS Vehicle Integration 
C. Cooper MTI	 - LSS SRM Processing 
S. Otto MMC	 - LSS ET Processing 
These personnel participated in various team activities, 
assisted	 in	 the collection	 and evaluation	 of	 data,	 and 
contributed to reports contained in this document.
2.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PPjD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle 
was conducted on 11 September 1992 from 0930 - 1130 hours. The 
detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 398 and MLP-2 also included the 
primary flight elements OV-105 Endeavour (2nd flight), ET-45 
(LWT 38), and 81053 SRB's. Documentary photographs were taken 
of facility anomalies, potential sources of vehicle damaging 
debris, and vehicle configuration changes. 
Due to the continued concern over potential hydrogen leakage 
from the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical interface area during cryo].oad 
and launch, tygon tubes for hydrogen leak detectors LD54 and 
LD55 were installed at the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. The tygon 
tubes are intended to remain in place during cryogenic loading 
and be removed by the Ice Team during the T-3 hour hold. 
There were no significant vehicle anomalies. 
Three loose bolts along with small pieces of debris, such as 
tie-wraps, TPS trimmings, rope, writing pen, and a handrail 
securing pin, were picked up by the Inspection Team. Debris on 
the holddown post #5 and #6 haunches were cleared by MLP deck 
operations technicians. 
All discrepancies were corrected real-time by Pad Operations 
and no items were entered in S0007, appendix K. 
5
rLi •i.	 k 4	
-	 :
. 4 . •• 
4. 
4 
t J:	 . 
ri'	 •. 
•'!.•. . 
3f .. 
•:'
Pre-flight configuration of the bipod jack pad closeouts, the 
intertank TPS acreage, and the LH2 tank flange closeout. Post 
ET separation photography would reveal the loss of TPS from the 
intertank acreage and the LH2 tank flange closeout. 
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LH (-Y) vertical strut/cable tray TPS covering prior to 
cryogenic fuel loading. Cracks have appeared in this general 
area after cryoload due to the elimination of a stress relief 
gap as part of a manufacturing process enhancement change. 
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Due to OSHA/safety concerns, semi-permanent handrails were 
installed at the FSS 95 foot level-to-MLP deck crossover. The 
handrails remained in place during launch and did not become a 
debris issue.
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3.0 LAUNCH 
STS-47 was launched at 12:14:23:00.010 GMT (10:23:00 a.m. 
local) on 12 September 1992. 
3.1 ICE/FROST INSPECTION 
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was 
performed on 12 September 1992 from 0520 to 0730 hours during 
the two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There 
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 violations. 
There were no conditions outside of the established data base. 
Ambient weather conditions at the time of the inspection were: 
Temperature:	 75.9 Fahrenheit 
Relative Humidity:	 91.0 % 
Wind Speed:	 4.6 Knots	 - 
Wind Direction:	 303 Degrees 
A hand-held Minolta/Land Cyclops radiometer was utilized to ob-
tain surface temperature measurements for an overall thermal 
assessment of the vehicle, as shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
3.2 ORBITER 
No Orbiter tile anomalies were observed. An IPR was taken 
against a .40L x .15W x .0625D-inch dent, or cavity, on the 
inboard edge of the LH RCC panel #9. The IPR was dispositioned 
to fly as-is. All RCS thruster paper covers and water spray 
boiler plugs were intact. Less than usual ice/frost was present 
at the SSME heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces. Condensate was 
present on all SSME heat shields and on base heat shield tiles. 
An infrared scan revealed no unusual temperature gradients on 
the base heat shield or engine mounted heat shields. No unusual 
vapors originated from inside the SSME nozzles. 
3.3 SOLID ROT BOOSTERS 
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. The K5NA 
closeouts of the aft booster stiffener ring splice plates were 
intact. The Cyclops radiometer recorded RH and LH SRB case 
surface temperatures between 75 and 79 degrees Fahrenheit (F) 
In comparison, temperatures measured by a portable Shuttle 
Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning radiometer ranged from 
76 to 80 degrees F and the SRB GEl (Ground Environment 
Instrumentation) measured temperatures ranging from 77 to 82 
degrees F. All measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees 
F minimum requirement. The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk 
Temperature (PT) supplied by MTI was 82 degrees F, which was 
within the required range of 44-86 degrees F. 
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Figure 2. SSV INFRARED SCANNER 
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3.4 EXTERNAL TANK 
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run 
from 0215 to 1015 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 3. 
The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost accumulation 
on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload. 
There was light condensate, but no ice/frost accumulations, on 
the L02 tank ogive and barrel sections. There were no TPS 
anomalies. The tumble valve cover was intact. The pressuriza-
tion line and support ramps were in nominal configuration. The 
Cyclops radiometer measured surface temperatures that averaged 
72 degrees F on the ogive and 69 degrees F on the barrel 
section. In comparison, SURFICE predicted temperatures of 64 
degrees F on the ogive and 58 degrees F on the barrel. 
Some light run-off condensate was present on the intertank TPS. 
Small frost spots appeared in the stringer valleys at both the 
LH2 and L02 tank-to-intertank flanges. No unusual vapors or ice 
formations were present on the -ET umbilical carrier plate. The 
Cyclops radiometer measured temperatures that averaged 75 
degrees F. 
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Light condensate, 
but no ice or frost, was present on the acreage and aft dome. 
The Cyclops radiometer measured surface temperatures that 
averaged 64 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 70 degrees F on 
the lower LH2 tank. In comparison, SURFICE predicted tempera-
tures of 54 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 63 degrees F on 
the lower LH2 tank. 
There were no anomalies on the bipods, bipod jack pad 
closeouts, PAL ramp, cable tray/press line ice/frost ramps, 
longerons, thrust struts, manhole covers, or aft dome apex. 
Some ice/frost was present in the ET/SRB cable tray-to-upper 
strut fairing expansion joints. Ice/frost covered the lower EB 
fittings outboard to the strut pin hole with condensate on the 
rest of the fitting. The struts were dry. A 4-inch long by 
1/4-inch wide crack was present in the forward surface TPS 
covering of the -Y vertical strut cable tray near the longeron 
closeout interface. The crack exhibited no offset and was not 
filled with ice or frost. The appearance of the crack was 
expected due to the elimination of the stress relief gap at the 
factory. 
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline 
bellows and support brackets. 
There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The 
purge barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding 
positive purge pressure. There were no accumulations of 
ice/frost on the acreage areas of the umbilical. Formation of 
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13 
ice/ frost on the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge 
vents was typical. Normal venting of nitrogen purge gas had 
occurred during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. 
Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both 
burst disks was typical. The LH2 feedline bellows were wet with 
condensate. 
Amounts of ice/frost on the top, aft, and inboard sides of the 
LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier were typical; and less than 
usual on the outboard side. Typical ice/frost fingers had 
formed on the pyro canister and plate gap purge vents. Less 
than usual ice/frost had accumulated on the aft pyrotechnic 
canister bondline. Thin foam exists in this area due to an 
incorrect mold manufacture. The amount and location of the 
ice/frost was acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 
criteria. A 3-inch ice/frost finger had formed on the cable 
tray vent hole. No ice/frost had formed on the 17-inch flapper 
valve actuator access port foam plug closeout. No unusual 
vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, stable 
replenish, and launch. 
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing was in proper 
position prior to removal. The tubing was successfully removed 
from the vehicle. There was no flight hardware or TPS contact. 
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations /anomalies consisted 
of five OTV recorded items: 
Anomaly 001 documented ice/frost spots in the intertank -z side 
string valleys at both L02 tank and LH2 tank flange closeouts. 
The ice/frost spots were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 002 documented a 4-inch crack in the forward surface 
TPS covering of the -Y vertical strut cable tray near the 
longeron closeout interface. The crack exhibited no offset and 
were not filled with ice or frost. The condition was acceptable 
for launch per NSTS-08303 and CR SO41254C. 
Anomaly 003 documented two froth spots at the LH2 dome apex 
closeout bondline and the +Z manhole cover closeout. The condi-
tions were acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
Anomaly 004 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
on the L02 umbilical purge vents and LH2 umbilical purge vents, 
purge barrier (baggie), and LH2 recirculation line bellows. The 
ice/frost formations were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 005 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
in the L02 feedline bellows and support brackets. These ice and 
frost formations were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
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3.5 FACILITY 
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and 
properly configured for launch. There was no debris on the MLP 
deck or in the SRB holddown post areas. Five "Do Not Enter" 
safety signs with ropes were removed from the FSS-to-ML1P zero 
level crossover (1), MLP south side (2), LH2 TSM door (1), and 
L02 TSM door (1). 
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-O 
umbilicals, though typical accumulations of ice/frost were 
present on the cryogenic lines and purge shrouds. There was 
also no apparent leakage anywhere on the GH2 vent line or GUCP. 
The GH2 vent line modification prevented ice from forming, but 
some ice/frost, which was expected, had accumulated on the GUCP 
legs and on the uninsulated parts of the umbilical carrier 
plate. 
Visual and infrared observations of the GOX seals confirmed no 
leakage. No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible after the 
GOX vent hood was retracted. No icicles had formed on the GOX 
vent ducts.
15
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Light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulation, was present 
on the ET L02 and LH2 tank TPS acreage 
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An IPR was taken against an apparent dent, or cavity, on the 
left wing RCC panel #9 adjacent to the T-seal. The IPR was 
dispositioned to fly as-is.
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Less than usual ice/frost had formed at the SSME heat shield-
to-nozzle interfaces. An infrared scan revealed no unusual 
temperature gradients on the base heat shield or engine mounted 
heat shields.
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Typical amounts of ice/frost had formed in the L02 feedline 
support bracket and upper bellows 
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One crack, approximately 6 inches long, appeared in the LH (-Y) 
vertical strut/cable tray forward facing TPS covering near the 
longeron closeout interface. A stress relief cut in the TPS to 
allow for structural movement had been deleted by design. This 
condition was acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria 
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Overall view of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. There were no TPS 
anomalies or unusual ice/frost formations. 
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Less than usual ice/frost had tormed on the outboard and top 
sides of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical/purge barrier. Typical 
amounts of ice had accumulated on the plate gap and pyrotechnic 
canister purge vents, and in the LH2 recirculation line bellows 
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Typical in size, ice/frost fingers had formed on the aft pyro 
canister purge vent and LH2 umbilical cable tray vent hole. No 
ice or frost had accumulated on the 17-inch flapper valve 
actuator access port foam plug closeout. 
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4.0 POST LAUNCH PD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The post launch inspection of the MLP, FSS, pad surface, and 
pad acreage was conducted on 12 September 1992 from Launch + 1 
to 3 hours. No flight hardware or TPS materials were found. 
EPON shim material was intact and bonded to the shoes on all 
south holddown posts. There was no visual indication of a stud 
hang-up on any of the south holddown posts. No ordnance 
fragments were found in the south HDP stud holes. All of the 
north HDP doghouse blast covers were in the closed position and 
exhibited less than normal erosion. The SRB aft skirt purge 
lines were in place but slightly damaged. The SRB T-O umbili-
cals exhibited minor damage. 
The GOX vent arm, OAA, and TSM's showed the usual minor amount 
of damage. The GH2 vent line latched on the eighth tooth of 
the latching mechanism. There were no loose cables, but the 
north latch appeared to'have contacted the north saddle stabi-
lizer. The damage from this contact was minimal and has 
occurred on previous launches. The GH2 vent line showed typical 
signs of SRB plume impingement. The ET intertank access 
structure also sustained typical plume heating effects. The 
wire mesh on one of the hand rails had been pushed outward. 
Damage to the facility appeared to be less than usual and 
included: 
1. A 12" x 12" metal safety sign was found on the east 
side of the pad surface. 
2. An FSS "175 foot level" sign was found on the grating 
of the FSS 175 foot level. 
All seven emergency egress slidewire baskets were secured on 
the FSS 195 foot level and sustained no launch damage. 
An inspection of the beach from UCS-10 to Titan complex 40, the 
beach road, the railroad tracks, and the water areas around the 
pad and under the flight path was completed. No flight hardware 
was found. 
MP-2 was configured with overpressure sensors at the top of 
both TSM's, at the bottom of both SRB exhaust holes, and at the 
bottom of the SSME exhaust hole. All sensor readings were 
consistent with previous launches and within nominal limits 
with the exception of the sensor on top of the LH2 TSM. This 
sensor malfunctioned.
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Patrick AFB and MILA radars were configured in a mode for 
increased sensitivity for the purpose of observing any debris 
falling from the vehicle during ascent but after SRB separation 
(due to the masking effect of the SRB exhaust plume). Most of 
the signal registrations were very weak and often barely detec-
table, which generally compares with the types of particles 
detected on previous Shuttle flights. A total of 73 particles 
were imaged in the T+138 to 326 second time period. Twenty-five 
of the particles were imaged by only one radar, 42 particles 
were imaged by two radars, and 6 particles were imaged by all 
three radars. The number and signal strength of the detected 
particles was comparable to the STS-46 mission. 
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section 9. 
-	
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Plume erosion of the south SRB hoiddown posts was typical. EPON 
shim material was intact and bonded to the hoiddown post shoes. 
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All of the north hoiddown post doghouse blast covers were 
in the closed position and showed less than usual erosion 
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5.0 FILM RVLEW AND PROBLEM REPORTS 
Post Launch Anomalies observed in the Film Review were 
presented to the Mission Management Team, Shuttle managers, and 
vehicle systems engineers. These anomalies are listed in 
Section 9. 
5.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO 
A total of 109 film and video data items, which included forty 
videos, forty-four 16mm films, twenty-two 35nun films, and three 
70mm films, were reviewed starting on launch day. 
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed 
that would have affected the mission. 
SSME ignition, Mach diamond formation, and gimbal profile 
appeared normal. No discolorations or unusual streaks were 
visible in the Mach diamonds or exhaust plumes (E-2, 3, 19, 20, 
P..SS STI, C/S-2 STI, OTV 151, 163, 170)) 
Fore-and-aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the 
centerline area between the SSME cluster occurred during engine 
start-up. The motion was similar to that observed on previous 
launches (E-76). 
SSME ignition vibration/acoustics caused numerous pieces of 
ice/frost to fall from the LH2 and L02 ET/Orbiter umbilicals. 
The 4-inch diameter ice formation on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical 
cable tray vent hole fell off entirely during SSME ignition. No 
damage to Orbiter tiles was visible. There were no unusual 
vapors or cryogenic drips from the ET/ORB umbilicals during 
tanking, stable replenish, ignition, or liftoff (OTV 109, 150, 
154, 163, 164, OTV 056, E-4). One piece of ice fell from the 
L02 feedline upper bellows and passed in between the Orbiter 
and External Tank with no apparent contact (E-26). 
SSME ignition vibration and acoustics caused the loss of tile 
surface coating material from one place on the body flap and 
one place on the LH RCS stinger aft surface (E-20). This film 
item also featured a burning piece of the magnesium button from 
the hydrogen burn ignitor at the L02 TSM southwest corner. The 
magnesium did not contact any flight hardware and operation of 
the ignitor was nominal. 
A small dark particle entered the field of view near the 
payload bay door centerline and fell aft along the vertical 
stabilizer without contacting flight hardware (E-76, frame 
614) .
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Light frost was present in the ET GOX vent louvers. There was 
no TPS damage to the ET nose cone acreage, footprint, or 
fairing (OTV 160, 161). ET "twang" of approximately 34 inches 
was typical (E-79). The ET nosecone/pressure spike returned to 
the 12 inch mark at T-0. 
There were no visual indications of stud hang-ups. No ordnance 
debris fell from any of the HDP DCS/stud holes. North holddown 
post doghouse blast covers closed normally. 
The Orbiter LH2 and L02 T-0 umbilicals disconnected and 
retracted properly (OTV 149, 163). GUCP disconnect from the 
External Tank was nominal (OTV 104). The GH2 vent line 
retracted and latched normally with no rebound. There was no 
excessive slack in the static retract lanyard (E-33, 41, 42, 
48, 50) 
Numerous debris particles, including pieces of SRB throat plug, 
were ejected upward out of the SRB exhaust holes. None of the 
objects contacted the vehicle, but some were drawn into the 
exhaust plumes by aspiration (E-i, 2, 25, 26). A large piece of 
SP.B throat plug foam first appeared coming out of the exhaust 
hole between HDP #6 and #8, moved upward along side the LH SRB 
booster, and fell aft without contacting the Orbiter (E-3, 16, 
18). Similarly, a large piece of SRB throat plug foam appeared 
in the field of view near the camera, but did not contact 
the vehicle (E-17). One small debris particle with a smoke 
trail moved upward into the field of view and eventually fell 
aft again without impacting the vehicle (E-26). 
Film item E-60 confirmed that water flowed properly from all 
P rainbirds. 
Numerous pieces of ice from the cryogenic lines on the north 
side of the MLP were lifted upward over the flame trench and 
the north MLP area by the SBB exhaust shock wave. None of the 
pieces impacted the vehicle (E-4, OTV 141, 160, 170, TV-4B, 
TV-7) . Large white object over north area of the MLP was a 
piece of ice from the cryogenic line ejected upward by SRB 
plume shock wave (E-52, 76). A large piece of SRB Sound 
suppression water trough material was visible above the LH2 TSM 
after the vehicle cleared the frame (E-76). 
ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier (baggie) fell aft shortly after 
the roll maneuver at 14:23:16.698 GMT (E-54, 213). 
Particles, most likely small pieces of SRB propellant, fell out 
of the LH SRB plume at 14:23:19.336 GMT (E-54). 
A bird was first visible near the. lower edge of the frame in 
film item E-59 falling along side the SRB plume at 14:23:32.105 
GMT. Film item E-57 showed the bird was closer to the camera 
lens than the vehicle.
29
Clusters of particles falling aft of the Orbiter after comple-
tion of the roll maneuver were traced to the forward RCS 
thrusters and were pieces of RCS paper covers. Other pieces of 
RCS paper covers were visible passing over the Orbiter wings 
(E-213, 222). 
Flashes occurred in the SSME plume during ascent at 
14:23:19.857, 14:23:45.750, and 14:23:48.873 GMT (E-207, 222, 
223, TV-48). 
Movement of the body flap was similar to previous flights 
(E-207) 
ET aft dome charring, exhaust plume recirculation, SRB plume 
tai].off, and SRB separation appeared normal (TV 13, 21B, E-207, 
208, 223) 
Frustum separation from the forward skirts and parachute 
deployment appeared normal. During reefing one parachute was 
late in opening but reach full reef position before nozzle 
severance (E-302). Nozzle severance debris, which was typical, 
caused some small tears/damage to the parachutes. Water splash 
down was not visible (E-301, 302). 
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Disconnect and separation of the LH2 T-O umbilical from the 
Orbiter was nominal. A large piece of SRB throat plug material 
was ejected upward out of the exhaust hole, but did not contact 
any flight hardware.
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All facility rainbirds operated properly. Light-colored objects 
over the north end of the MLP were pieces of SRB throat plug 
material and ice from the cryogenic lines ejected upward by the 
SRB plume/exhaust.
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Clusters of particles falling aft of the Orbiter shortly after 
completion of the roll maneuver were pieces of the LH2 and L02 
ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier (baggie) material. Loss of the 
purge barrier during flight is a common and expected occurrence 
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5.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO 
DTO-0312 was performed by the flight crew and seventy 70mm 
still images were obtained of the ET after separation from the 
Orbiter. OV-105 was equipped to carry umbilical cameras: one 
35mm and one 16mm with a 5mm lens. (The other 16mm camera with 
the 10mm lens had been deleted prior to launch due to an inter-
ference problem with the ET door latch drive shaft). 
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed 
that would have been a safety of flight concern. 
SEB separation from the ET was nominal. Separation of the -Y 
ET/SRB upper and diagonal struts appeared normal. No loss of 
TPS from the upper strut fairing was visible. No anomalies were 
observed on the LH SRB segment cases and joints, forward skirt, 
and frustum. 
ET separation from the Orbiter appeared nominal. The BSM burn 
scars on the L02 tank were typical. No anomalies were observed 
on the nosecone, L02 tank acreage, PAL ramps, RSS antennae, 
flight door, bipod jack pad closeouts and bipod ramps, aft hard 
point, and aft dome acreage. Frozen hydrogen, but no TPS or 
structural damage, was visible on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical 
interface. Erosion and charring of TPS on the aft surfaces of 
the LH2 umbilical cable tray and the -Y vertical strut/cable 
tray was typical. Plume recirculation and aft dome heating 
caused the usual charring and "popcorning" of the NCFI foam. 
A brass- or copper-colored object drifted away from the LH2 
ET/ORB umbilical (16mm film, frame 4020). The origin of the 
object, a nut or spacer, has not been determined yet. 
A piece of dark debris, possibly a small wire cutting, entered 
the FOV (16mm film, frame 4249) from the inboard side of the 
vehicle and drifted upward out of sight. It reappeared at frame 
4855 drifting downward (aft). The object was inside the Orbiter 
aft compartment between the camera lens and the window pane. 
The object has crossed the near side (inside) of the window 
black retaining ring as it entered the field of view. The 
object was later observed to bounce against the glass window 
twice while crossing the field of view. 
The L02 ET/ORB umbilical 2-inch press line red seal/white RTV 
looked "blown out" on the outboard side but was actually the 
result of the overpressure test/closeout work at the pad. In 
addition, a layer of TPS had rolled back on the forward surface 
of the umbilical and possible foam damage appeared on the 
inboard side of the umbilical. Foam was also lost from the 
vertical and horizontal sections of the umbilical cable tray. 
Erosion and "popcorning" on the L02 feedline flange closeouts, 
+Y thrust strut flange closeout, and 5 press line ramps (small 
pieces) was typical.
An acreage divot to substrate was visible below the LH2 tank 
PAL ramp adjacent to the cable tray (XT-1528). 
Four 6-8 inch divots were clustered in the intertank-to-LH2 
tank flange closeout at the +Y+Z corner of the +Y thrust panel. 
Two 8-inch divots in the intertank-to-LH2 tank flange closeout 
and one 8-inch divot at the -Y+Z corner of the -Y thrust panel 
were clustered together. 
A 10-12 inch divot was visible in the LH2 flange closeout in 
-Y+Z quadrant. 
A 14-16 inch divot occurred in the intertank acreage between 
the bipods just forward of the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange 
closeout (IFA candidate). A large piece of foam had drifted aft 
(downward) into the field of view of the 16mm camera. The piece 
of foam seemed to exhibit stringer-sized indentations on one 
side and may indicate the piece of foam had originated from the intertank divot. 
A 4-6 inch divot was present in the LH2 tank acreage just below 
the Lii (-Y) bipod spindle/flange. 
A 6-8 inch divot was present behind the Lii bipod just forward 
of the jack pad closeout. The divot is located in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout. 
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View from the L02 ET/ORB umbilical separation camera showed a 
layer of TPS had rolled back on the forward surface of the 
umbilical and possible foam damage appeared on the inboard 
side. Foam was also lost from the vertical and horizontal 
sections of the umbilical cable tray. The 2-inch press line red 
seal/white RTV looked "blown out", but was actually the result 
of the overpressure test/closeout work at the pad. 
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Divots were visible in the LH2 tank acreage aft of the PAL ramp 
and LH bipod spindle, in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange 
closeout, and in the intertank acreage TPS between the bipods. 
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An IFA was taken against the 14-16 inch diameter divot in the 
intertank acreage TPS between the bipods. No anomalies/divots 
were apparent on the L02 tank or nosecone. 
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Flight crew hand-held photography of the External Tank revealed 
no anomalies on the L02 or LH2 tank TPS acreage. The BSM burn 
scar and aft dome charrin g were typical. Two divots occurred in 
the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout. 
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5.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
A total of 25 film and video data items, which included eight 
videos, eight 16mm high speed films, and nine 35mm large format 
films, were reviewed. 
Orbiter performance in the Heading Alignment Circle (HAC) and 
final approach appeared nominal. The landing gear extended 
properly. Left,
 and right main landing gear touchdown was almost 
simultaneous. 
Drag chute was deployed at approximately 175 knots (indicated) 
just before nose gear rotation. Deployment of the drag chute 
itself appeared nominal. However, three tiles on the vertical 
stabilizer "stinger" were damaged by contact with the chute 
risers. A 2-4 knot crosswind blew the drag chute eastward 
relative to the Orbiter and caused the nose to yaw left 
(westward). Active steering and braking was required to bring 
the vehicle back on runway centerline. 
Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth. There were no 
anomalies during rollout.
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6.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
Both Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and 
debris sources at CCAFS Hangar AF on 14 September 1992 from 
1030 to 1230 hours. From a debris standpoint, both SRB's were 
in excellent condition. 
6.1 RH SOLID ROT BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The RH frustum had 42 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners and one 
2-inch diameter area of missing TPS on the -Y axis at the 275 
ring frame. Minor localized blistering of the Hypalon paint had 
occurred predominantly along the 395 ring (Figure 4). All BSM 
aero heatshield covers were locked in the fully opened position 
though the left two cover attach rings had been bent by 
parachute riser entanglement. 
The RH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Both 
RSS antennae covers/phenolic base plates were intact. However, 
the +Z antenna phenolic plate was delaminated. Minor blistering 
of the Hypalori paint occurred on the systems tunnel cover and 
forward ET/SRB attach point (Figure 5). No pins were missing 
from the frustum severance ring. The forward separation bolt 
and electrical cables appeared to have separated cleanly. 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were 
generally in good condition. Minor trailing edge damage to the 
FJPS and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting 
from severance of the nozzle extension. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB 
aft struts, ETA ring, lEA, and lEA covers appeared undamaged. 
The upper strut fairing was missing a 4" x 3/4" area of K5NA 
and the substrate was charred. All three aft booster stiffener 
rings sustained water impact damage. The aft booster stiffener 
ring splice plate closeouts were intact and no K5NA material 
was missing. 
The phenolic material on the kick ring was de].aminated. The 
K5NA closeouts (protective domes) on the kick ring forward and 
aft fasteners had been eliminated. RTV-133 replaced the K5NA 
over the forward fasteners. Three divots, measuring 3" in 
diameter, 4"x2", and 4 11 x2", had occurred on the aft skirt TPS 
(Figure 6). 
All Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated 
properly. This was the tenth flight utilizing the optimized 
link. Pieces of EPON shim were missing from HDP #4 (3-inch 
diameter) and HDP #3 (2-inch diameter). The material was lost 
prior to water impact (sooted/charred substrate) 
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The RE frustum had 42 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners and one area 
of missing TPS at the -Y axis near the 275 ring frame. All BSM 
aero heat shield covers were locked in the fully opened 
position though the left two cover attach rings had been bent 
by parachute riser entanglement.
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The RH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Minor 
blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred in localized areas. 
Both RSS antenna covers/TPS were intact though the +Z antenna 
phenolic plate was delaminated.
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MSA-2 TPS was missing from two areas over aft skirt fasteners 
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6.2 LH SOLID ROT BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The LB frustum had 25 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners and was 
missing MSA-2 (1.5-inch diameter) from one location between the 
+Y and +Z axes on the 381 ring frame (Figure 7). There was 
minor localized blistering of the Hypalon paint. The BSM aero 
heatshield covers were locked in the fully opened position. 
The LB forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. The 
phenolic plates on both RSS antennae were intact and undamaged 
(Figure 8). The forward separation bolt and electrical cables 
appeared to have separated cleanly. No pins were missing from 
the frustum severance ring. Minor blistering of the Hypalon 
paint occurred near the ET/SRB attach point and on the systems 
tunnel cover. 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good 
condition. In general, minor trailing edge damage to the FJPS 
and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from 
severance of the nozzle extension. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB 
aft struts, ETA ring, lEA, and lEA covers appeared undamaged. 
The upper strut fairing was missing a 5" x 2" area of K5NA and 
the substrate was charred. All three aft booster stiffener 
rings sustained water impact damage. The aft booster forward 
and center stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were intact 
and no K5NA material was missing. However, a 6"x3" piece of 
K5NA was missing from the aft stiffener ring. Though the 
remaining material showed signs of delamination, the surfaces 
were not sooted indicating the material was most likely lost at 
water impact. 
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaxninated. The 
K5NA closeouts (protective domes) on the kick ring forward and 
aft fasteners had been eliminated. RTV-133 replaced the K5NA 
over the forward fasteners. Three divots,. measuring 2" in 
diameter (two places near the BSM's) and 2"xl" (one place near 
HDP #7), occurred on the aft skirt acreage TPS (Figure 9). 
All four Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were properly 
seated. This was the tenth flight utilizing the optimized link. 
Pieces of EPON shim material were missing from HDP #7 prior to 
water impact (sooted/charred substrate) 
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Munn
The LII frustum had 25 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners and was 
missing MSA-2 from one location between the +Y and +Z axes on 
the 381 ring frame. The BSM aero heat shield covers were locked 
in the fully opened position.
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The LH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Minor 
blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred in localized areas. 
Both RSS antenna covers/TPS were intact and undamaged. 
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A 6"x3" piece of K5NA was missing from 
Though the remaining material showed si 
surfaces were not sooted indicating 
likely lost at water impact.
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the aft stiffener ring. 
gns of delamination, the 
the material was most 
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Pieces of the HDP #7 EPON shim were missing prior to water 
impact (sooted/charred substrate). 
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6.3 RECOVERED SPB DISASSEMBLY FINDINGS 
Post flight disassembly of the Debris Containment System (DCS) 
housings revealed an overall system retention of 99 percent and 
individual holddown post retention percentages as listed: 
% of Nut without % of Ordnance 
HDP # 2 large halves fragments % Overall 
1 99 94 99 
2 99 94 99 
3 99 98 99 
4 99 96 99 
5 99 96 99 
6 99 93 99 
7 99 94 99 
8 99 93 99
STS-47 was the tenth flight to utilize the new "optimized" 
frangible links in the holddàwn post DCS's. The link was 
designed to increase the DCS plunger velocity and improve the 
seating alignment while leaving the stud ejection velocity the 
same. The design was intended to prevent ordnance debris from 
falling out of the DCS yet not increase the likelihood of a 
stud hang-up. According to NSTS-07700, the Debris Containment 
System should retain a minimum of 90 percent of the ordnance 
debris. 
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 9. 
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7.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
A post landing debris inspection of OV-105 (Endeavour) was 
conducted on September 20-21, 1992, at the Kennedy Space Center 
on Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) Runway 33 and in the Orbiter 
Processing Facility bay #1. This inspection was performed to 
identify debris impact damage and, if possible, debris sources. 
The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 108 hits, of which 11 had 
a major dimension of one inch or greater. This total does not 
include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to 
SSME vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A 
comparison of these numbers to statistics from 34 previous 
missions of similar configuration ( excluding missions STS-23, 
25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42 which had damage from known 
debris sources), indicates that the both the total number of 
hits and the number of hits one inch or larger are less than 
average. Figures 10-13 show the TPS debris damage assessment 
for STS-47. 
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 47 hits, of 
which 3 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. These 
figures are much less than average (reference Figure 17) . The 
distribution of hits on the lower surface does not suggest a 
single source of ascent debris, but indicates a shedding of 
ice and Thermal Protection System (TPS) debris from random 
sources. 
The following table breaks down the STS-47 Orbiter debris 
damage by area:
HITS > 1"
	 TOTAL HITS 
Lower surface 3 48 
Upper surface 3 37 
Right side 2 3 
Left side 0 3 
Right OMS Pod 2 8 
Left OMS Pod 1 9 
TOTALS 11 108
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, 
tires, or brakes. The main landing gear tires were considered 
to be in excellent condition for a landing on the KSC runway. 
The EO-3 
obstructed 
The EQ-i 
functioned 
below the
(L02) ET/Orbiter separation device plunger was 
by two ordnance fragments and did not seat properly. 
and EO-2 separation devices appeared to have 
properly. No flight hardware was found on the runway 
umbilicals when the ET doors were opened. 
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Figure 13. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
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Damage to the base heat shield tiles was less than average. The 
SS #1 Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DS) closeout blanket splice 
at the 6:00 o'clock position exhibited minor fraying. All of 
the remaining DMHS blankets were in excellent condition. 
The LH rudder/speedbrake split-line thermal barrier was 
protruding slightly and exhibited minor fraying, but did not 
appear to be significantly damaged or deformed. 
Orbiter windows #3 and #4 exhibited light hazing with a few 
streaks. Hazing on the other windows was less than usual. 
Surface wipes were taken from all forward facing windows (#1 
through #6) for laboratory analysis (reference Figure 14). 
Detailed examination of the windows revealed on-orbit debris 
impacts to windows #5, 6, and 7. The depth of the impacts 
ranged from 0.0041 to 0.0056 inches, which exceeded the drawing 
acceptance criteria of 0.0006 inches. All three windows will be 
removed and replaced. Twenty-eight tile impact sites 
(including three larger than one inch) were noted on the 
perimeter tiles around windows #2 through #6. All of these hits 
were shallow in depth and may have been caused by the RTV used 
to bond paper covers to the FRCS nozzles, exhaust products from 
the SPE booster separation motors, or ice/TPS debris from the 
External Tank L02 tank. 
Samples were taken from other selected sites for laboratory 
analysis (reference Figure 14). 
Runway 33 was inspected and swept by KSC EG&G SLF personnel on 
19 September 1992 and all potentially damaging debris was 
removed. A post landing inspection of Runway 33 was performed 
immediately after landing. The only unexpected flight hardware 
found were numerous pieces of tile material from the vertical 
stabilizer "stinger" and a piece of red RTV material from the 
RH outboard Main Landing Gear tire pressure instrumentation 
cable. 
This flight marked the third use of the Orbiter drag chute. The 
drag chute appeared to have functioned nominally. However, 
three tiles on the LH edge of the vertical stabilizer "stinger" 
suffered significant damage/material loss due to contact with 
the riser lines during chute deployment. Another tile, on the 
lower (-Z) RH edge of the drag chute opening, was slightly 
damaged by separation of the chute compartment door. All drag 
chute hardware was recovered and showed no signs of abnormal 
operation (reference Figure 15 for recovery locations) 
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) was used to measure the 
surface temperatures of three areas on the Orbiter (per OSD 
V09AJO.095) . Eighteen minutes a-fter landing, the Orbiter 
Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) nosecap was 165 degrees 
Fahrenheit (F). Twenty-one minutes after landing the RH wing 
leading edge RCC panel #9 was 112 degrees F, and panel #17 was 
113 degrees F (reference Figure 16). 
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Figure 14. CHEMICAL SAMPLE LOCATIONS 
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Figure 16. TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS 
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In summary, the number of Orbiter TPS debris hits was less than 
average when compared to previous missions (reference Figures 
17 and 18). From a debris damage standpoint, this flight 
represents one of the best in the Space Shuttle Program. 
Orbiter Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 9. 
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F7GUREI7: ORBITER POSTFLIGHT DEBRIS DAMAGE SUMMARY 
LOWER SURFACE ENTIRE VEHICLE 
HITS> 1 INCH TOTAL HITS HITS> 1 INCH TOTAL HITS 
STS-6 15 80 36 120 
STS-8 3 29 7. 56 
STS-9 (41-A) 9 49 14 58 
STS-11 (41-B) 11 19 34 63 
STS-13 (41-C) 5 27 8 36 
STS- 14(41-D) 10 44 30 111 
STS-1 7 (41-G) 25 69 36 154 
STS-19 (51-A) 14 66 20 87 
STS-20 (51-C) 24 67 28 81 
STS-27 (51-1) 21 96 33 141 
STS-28 (51-J) 7 66 17 111 
STS-30 (61-A) 24 129 34 183 
STS-31 (61-B) 37 177 55 257 
STS-32 (61-C) 20 134 39 193 
STS-29 18 100 23 132 
STS-28R 13 60 20 76 
STS-34 17 51 18 53 
STS-33R 21 107 21 118 
STS-32R 13 111 15 120 
STS-36 17 61 19 81 
STS-31R 13 47 14 63 
STS-41 13 64 16 76 
STS-38 7 70 8 81 
STS-35 15 132 17 147 
STS-37 7 91 10 113 
STS-39 14 217 16 238 
STS-40 23 153 25 197 
STS-43 24 122 25 131 
STS-48 14 100 25 182 
STS-44 6 74 9 101 
STS-45 18 122 22 172 
STS-49 6 55 11 114 
STS-50 28 141 45 184 
STS-46 11 186 22 236 
AVERAGE 15.4 91.6 22.7 125.5 
SIGMA 7.5 46.7 11.1 56.8 
.5 .. ....48......•.........: ............ ...................:..1.t.:..,........r......,.	 ............ ......	 .108..
MISSIONS STS-23,24,25,26,26R, 27R, 30R, AND 42 ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS ANALYSIS 
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOURCES 
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OV-105 Endeavour landed at the Kennedy Space Center 
Shuttle Landing Facility Runway 33 on 20 September 1992 
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Overall view of Orbiter left side
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Overall view of Orbiter right side 
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The Orbiter lower surface tiles sustained a total of 47 hits, 
of which three had a major dimension of 1-inch or greater. 
These numbers are much less than average. 
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Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation 
ordnance devices appeared to have functioned properly. No 
flight hardware was found on the runway below the umbilical 
when the ET door was opened.
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Overall view of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. No flight hardware 
was found on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door 
was opened.
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The EO-3 (L02) separation device debris plunger was obstructed 
by two ordnance fragments and was prevented from seating 
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The LH rudder/speed brake split-line thermal barrier was 
protruding slightly and exhibited minor fraying, but did not 
appear significantly damaged or deformed. 
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Orbiter windows #3 and #4 exhibited light hazing with a few 
streaks. Hazing on the other windows was less than usual. 
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Inspection of Runway 33 immediately after landing revealed 
numerous pieces of tile material from the vertical stabilizer 
"stinger" and a piece of red RTV material from the RH outboard 
main landing gear tire pressure instrumentation cable. 
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This flight marked the third use of the Orbiter drag chute. 
The drag chute itself appeared to have functioned normally 
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Three tiles on the left edge of the vertical stabilizer 
"stinger" sustained significant damage/material loss due to 
contact with the riser lines during chute deployment. 
87	 ORGNAL PAGE 
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
8.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS 
A total of nine samples were obtained from OV-105 Endeavour 
during the STS-47 post landing debris assessment at Kennedy 
Space Center (reference Figure 14). The nine submitted samples 
consisted of 8 window wipes (Windows 1-8) and 1 scrape from a 
lower surface tile. The samples were analyzed by the NASA KSC 
Microchemical Analysis Branch (MAB) for material composition 
and comparison to known STS materials. Debris analysis involves 
the placing and correlating of particles with respect to 
composition, thermal (mission) effects, and availability. 
Sample results and analyses are listed by Orbiter location in 
the following summaries: 
Orbiter Windows 
Results of the window sample analysis revealed the presence of 
the following materials: 
1. Metallics 
2. RTV, silica tile, insulation 
3. Paints and rust 
4. Cerium-rich material 
5. Organics 
6. Earth compounds 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
1. Metallic particles (zinc, aluminum, stainless and 
carbon steel alloys) are common to SR.B/BSM exhaust 
residue, but are not considered a debris concern in 
this quantity (micrometer) and have not generated a 
known debris effect. 
2. RTV, silica tile, and insulation originate from Orbiter 
thermal protection system (TPS). 
3. Paint is of flight hardware/facility/GSE origin, also 
detected was zinc-rich primer; rust is an SRB BSM 
exhaust residue. 
4. Cerium-rich material is an Orbiter window polishing 
residue. Cerium is a rare earth element and not common 
to the landing site. 
5. Organics are being analyzed by chemical fingerprint 
(Infrared Spectroscopy) method; results are pending. 
This detailed process is more difficult due to small 
sample quantity. Early analysis indicates some similar 
materials as reported in the STS-46 organic results. 
6. Earth compounds (alpha-quartz, calcite, salts, and 
calcium-silica rich materials) originate from the 
landing site.
I 
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Lower Surface Tile (LH outboard elevon) 
Results of the lower surface tile (LH outboard elevon) sample 
indicated the presence of the following material: 
1. Silica-rich tile 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
1. Silica-rich tile material originates from Orbiter 
thermal protection system (TPS). The sample did 
appear to be heat affected (fused with pumaceous 
structure) 
STS-46 Organic Analysis 
Results of the STS-46 Organic analysis indicated the presence 
of the following materials: 
1. Proteinaceous 
2. White polymeric 
3. Foam-like 
4. Rubbery 
5. Crystalline 
6. Ester-based 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
1. Proteinaceous material was further evaluated in the 
laboratory and found to be insect remains and deposits. 
2. White polymeric materials were found to include items 
with cellulosic characteristics, an aromatic polyamide 
similar to Nylon 4, and calcium carbonate-filled of a 
probable adhesive origin. These could be products from 
the protective window covers; evaluation is continuing. 
3. Foam-like materials detected were polyurethane and 
possible Ensolite (modified polyvinylchloride (PVC) 
with nitrile rubber). Probable sources are not defined 
at this time, but could include ET insulation and 
protective window covers. 
4. Rubbery materials were identified as an aluminum 
silicate-filled rubber, a product with silicate and 
ester' characteristics such as Duxseal, and methyl 
silicone as red RTV. Source of the rubber and Duxseal-
like materials is under evaluation. Red RTV is used as 
a primary bonding product for Orbiter TPS. 
5. Crystalline material with an amide characteristic was 
detected, but a probable source has not been identified 
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6. Cellulosic fibers originate from the sample cloth used 
in sampling. 
7. Ester-based material appears to be an anti-static 
agent. The precise source of this item is under 
evaluation. 
Conclusions 
The STS-47 mission sustained Orbiter tile damage to a much 
lesser than average degree. The chemical analysis results from 
post flight samples did not point to a single source of 
damaging debris. 
Orbiter window samples provided evidence of SRB BSM exhaust, 
Orbiter fl'S, Orbiter window polishing compound, landing site 
products, organics, and paint. Although the variety of SRB BSM 
exhaust residuals seemed consistent with previous missions, the 
variety of Orbiter TPS residuals increased in the different 
forms of each TPS type, which included: dense tile coatings, 
silica-rich insulation, silica-aluminum rich insulation and 
fibers, silica-rich dense coating, and heated tile material 
with a puinaceous, fused appearance (from the tile sample). The 
residual variety of earth compounds appeared constant though 
the results of organic analyses have not yet been completed 
(reference Figure 19). Included in this report are the results 
of the STS-46 organic analysis. The immediate laboratory 
observation was an increase (approximately 50%) in sample 
material. The results of this analysis are similar to that of 
STS-50 in that new entries do not appear related to a debris 
problem. 
The lower surface tile (LH outboard elevon) sample provided 
evidence of only fused-pumaceous tile material. This data is 
consistent with that observed in previous sampling (reference 
Figure 19).
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9.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES 
Based on the debris inspections and film review, eleven Post 
Launch Anomalies, including two IFA candidates, were observed 
on the STS-47 mission assessment. 
9.1 LAUNCH PAD/FACILITY 
1. No items. 
9.2 EXTERNAL TANK 
1. A copper-colored nut or spacer drifted away from the LH2 
ET/ORB umbilical area after ET separation from the Orbiter. The 
origin of this object has not been determined yet. 
2. An acreage divot to substrate was visible below the LH2 
tank PAL ramp adjacent to the cable tray (XT-1528). 
3. A 4-6 inch divot was present in the LH2 tank acreage just 
below the LH (-Y) bipod spindle/flange. 
4. A total of 9 divots occurred in the LH2 tank-to-intertank 
flange closeout. 
5. A 14-16 inch divot occurred in the intertank acreage 
between the bipods just forward of the LH2 tank-to-intertank 
flange close out (IFA candidate). 
6. A layer of TPS had rolled back on the forward surface of 
the L02 ET/ORB umbilical and possible foam damage appeared on 
the inboard side of the umbilical interface. Foam was also 
lost from the vertical and horizontal sections of the umbilical 
cable tray. 
9.3 SOLID ROT BOOSTERS 
1. Pieces of EPON shim were missing from RH SRB aft skirt HDP 
#3 and #4 prior to water impact (sooted/charred substrate). 
2. K5NA was missing from the LH aft booster aft stiffener ring 
spice plate closeout. Although the K5NA was lost at water 
impact (clean substrate), examination of the remaining material 
may have revealed a debonding problem. 
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9.4 ORBITER 
1. EO-3 debris plunger was obstructed by ordnance fragments 
and had not seated. 
2. Drag chute risers damaged three tiles on the vertical 
stabilizer "stinger". Tile pieces from this damage site were 
found on the runway along with the drag chute hardware. 
3. A 2-4 knot crosswind blew the drag chute somewhat eastward 
relative to the Orbiter and caused the nose to yaw left 
(westward). Active steering and braking was required to bring 
the vehicle back on runway center line. Since this was an unex-
pected controllability concern, an IFA was taken. 
VII
Appendix A. JSC Photographic Analysis Summary 
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November 3, 1992 
The following Summary of Significant Events report is from the Johnson Space Center NSTS 
Photographic and Television Analysis Project, STS-47 Final Report, and was completed 
October 21, 1992. Publication numbers are LESC-30462 and JSC-25994-47. The actual 
document can be obtained through the LESC library/333-6594 or Christine Dailey /483-5336 
of the NSTS Photographic and Television Analysis Project. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events 
2.1	 Debris 
2.1.1	 Debris near the Time of SSME Ignition 
2.1.1.1	 LH2 and L02 Umbilical Disconnect Debris 
(Cameras E-3, E-17, E-18, E-31, E-57, E-65, 
E-79, OTV-109, OTV-154, OTV-163) 
The usual amount of ice debris from the L02 and LH2 TSM T-O umbilicals and the 
ET/Orbiter umbilicals were noted on many of the MLP camera films. No follow up action 
is expected. 
2.1.1.2	 Debris Contacts Left SRB 
(Camera E-13) 
A small piece of dark debris appeared to contact the left SRB prior to SRB ignition. There 
appeared to be no damage to the SRB. No follow up action is expected. 
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2. 1 . 2	 Debris near the Time of SRB Ignition 
2.1.2.1
	
SRB Flame Duct Debris (Task #7) 
(Cameras E-1, E-2, E-5, E-6, E-15, E-52, E-60, E-76) 
Figure 2.1.2.1	 Multiple Pieces of White Debris Seen Exiting 
Flame Duct 
Multiple pieces of white debris were seen exiting from the flame duct at liftoff, move 
upward, and then appeared to travel above the body flap seen on camera E-1. Some of the 
debris appeared to be moving toward the Orbiter, but did not appear to strike the vehicle. 
Two pieces of debris were observed, one from E- 1 and the other from E-5 and E-52, 
which traveled higher than expected. Upon reviewing the camera E-1, E-5 and E-52 
films, it was discovered that the debris observed from camera E-5 was not the same as that 
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seen on E- 1 but was the same as seen on E-52. A velocity and trajectory analysis was 
performed for the two pieces of debris seen on E-52. The highest point reached by either 
piece of debris on the trajectory was calculated as 15.9 feet which is approximately 11.0 
feet below the base. of the ET aft dome. The highest velocity reached by either piece of 
debris was determined to be 18.4 feet per second. 
On the camera E-76 film a single large piece of white debris originated from the flame duct 
and traveled towards the left SRB at SRB ignition. 
2.1.2.2	 Debris near Hoiddown Posts 
No SRB holddown post stud hang ups were seen on the STS-47 mission films. Less 
debris than usual was seen near the hoiddown posts. On camera E-8, a small dark piece 
of debris was seen near the RSRB hoiddown post M-2 DCS at SRB ignition. The debris 
did not appear to contact the vehicle. No follow up action is requested. 
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2.1.2.3	 Large Dark Debris near Left SRB 
(Camera E-31) 
Figure 2.1.2.3	 Large Dark Debris near Left SRB at .20 
Seconds MET 
A large dark piece of debris, first noted near the left SRB, traveled toward the left inboard 
elevon at approximately .20 seconds MET and did not appear to strike the vehicle. No 
follow up action is expected. 
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2. 1.3 Debris after Liftoff
Multiple pieces of debris were seen falling aft of the SLV from liftoff through ascent on the 
launch tracking views. Most of the debris sightings were probably RCS paper or ice from the 
ET/Orbiter umbilicals. None of the below-mentioned debris seen after liftoff appeared to 
strike the vehicle. Debris falling aft of the SLV after liftoff has been seen on films and videos 
from previous missions. Most of this type of debris has been attributed to ice or RCS paper. 
2.1.3.1	 SLV Debris at Tower Clear through Roll Maneuver 
(Camera E-52, E-54, E-57, E-59, E-211, E-213,) 
Several pieces of white debris were seen falling from the ET/Orbiter umbilical area into SSME 
exhaust plume just after tower clear. 
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2.1.3.2	 SLV Debris after Roll Maneuver 
(Cameras E-57, E-59, E-213, E-222, KTV4B) 
Figure 2.1.3.2a	 Large Debris Appeared between the Right 
Wing and the External Tank and Traveled Aft 
at 29 Seconds MET 
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Figure 2.1.3.21) Large Piece of Dark Debris Moving Aft Along the 
Right SRB Exhaust Plume Boundary at 32 Seconds 
MET 
On camera E-57 a large piece of light colored debris was seen moving towards the right wing 
and traveled aft at approximately 29 seconds MET (Figure 2.1.3.2a). The object appeared to 
move towards rather than away from the orbiter/plume area. This indicates that it was 
probably not vehicle related and may have been a bird. The object did not appear to strike the 
vehicle. 
On camera E-59, a large piece of dark debris was seen traveling aft along the right SRB 
exhaust plume boundary at 32 seconds MET (Figure 2.1.3.2b). Like the object seen on 
camera E-57, it appeared to move towards the vehicle and was probably not vehicle related. 
Again this was probably a bird. The object did not appear to strike the vehicle. 
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Figure 2.1.3.2c Multiple Pieces of Baggie Material from 
ET/Orbiter Umbilical Area at 19.4 Seconds MET 
On camera E-213 multiple pieces of baggie material were seen to originate from the 
ET/Orbiter umbilical area and travel aft after the roll maneuver. Approximately 3 seconds 
later, a piece of orange debris, possibly baggie material, was seen to travel from the 
RSRB exhaust plume area toward the SSME exhaust plume. 
On camera E-222 a single piece of orange colored debris was seen underneath the body 
flap and then traveled aft of the vehicle at 27.611 seconds MET. At 30.674 seconds 
MET, multiple pieces of light colored debris were seen originating from behind the SSME 
area. At 41.578 seconds MET, a light colored piece of debris appeared from behind the 
vertical stabilizer and fell away from the vehicle. 
On camera KTV-4B a piece of white debris was noted aft of the vehicle at approximately 
53 seconds MET. 
STS-47 Final Report
106	 ORIGINAL PAGE 
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
2.0	 Summary of Significant Events 
2.2	 MLP Events 
2.2.1	 Orange Vapor 
(Cameras E-19, E-76, OTV-170) 
Figure 2.2.1	 Orange Vapor (Possibly Free-Burning 
Hydrogen) Noted under the SSME Bells just 
prior to SSME Ignition 
Orange vapor (possibly free-burning hydrogen) was noted under the SSME bells near the 
southeast TSM hydrogen ignitor nozzle just prior to SSME ignition (T-5.541 seconds). 
The same orange vapor was also noted near SSME #3 during SSME ignition on the 
camera E-19 film. The orange vapor appeared to be less extensive than had been noted on 
previous missions. No further analysis has been requested. 
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2.2.2	 Light Vapor On Inboard Right Wing (Camera OTh'-154)
Figure 2.2.2	 Light Mist or Vapor at Junction of the Orbiter Right 
Inboard Elevon and the Right Wing at T-3.6 
Seconds MET 
A light mist or vapor, shown by arrow, was noted at the junction of the Orbiter right 
inboard elevon and the right wing at SSME ignition (T-3.6 seconds). No follow up action 
is expected.
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2.2.3	 Flexing of Base Heat Shield (Cameras E-77) 
A flexing of the base heat shield was noted during SSME ignition. Base heat shield 
motion was first reported on the STS-49 flight of Endeavour. At that time, an analysis of 
the base heat shield motion was conducted and it was concluded that the motion is not 
mission or vehicle specific. A hypothesis is that the motion is caused by pressure waves 
from the main engines during SSME ignition. No further analysis is expected. 
2.2.4	 Base Heat Shield Erosion (Cameras E-17, E-20) 
Minor TPS erosion was noted on the left RCS stinger base after SSME ignition on camera 
E-20 and possible TPS erosion was also seen on the right RCS stinger on camera E-17. 
Minor TPS erosion has been seen on previous mission films. No follow up action is 
expected. 
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2.3 
	
Ascent Events 
2.3.1	 Flares in SSME Exhaust Plume 
(Cameras E-54, E-207, E-222, E-223, KTV-4B) 
Figure 2.3.1	 Flare in SSME Exhaust Plume at 48.7 Seconds MET 
Flares were noted in the SSME exhaust plume at 19.8, 45.7, and 48.7 seconds MET. 
Flares during these time periods have been seen on several earlier missions. No follow up 
action is expected.
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2.3.2	 White Streak in SSME Plume at Approximately 40 Seconds 
MET 
(Cameras E-207, ET-207, KTV-4B) 
2.3.2	 Close-up of White Streak at 40 Seconds MET 
A white cloud (streak) of vapor was noted in the SSME exhaust plume at approximately 40 
seconds MET. The vaporous streak appeared to originate from the right OMS/RCS area of 
the Orbiter. One possible explanation is that the streak was caused by the atmospheric 
(moisture) conditions present at that point in the launch trajectory. No follow up action is 
expected.
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2.3.3	 Body Flap, Vertical Stabilizer, and Left Wing Motion 
(Task #4) 
(Cameras E-17, E-207, OTV-163, OTV-171) 
Slight body flap motion was seen on cameras E-17 and OTV-163 prior to and at liftoff. 
On camera OTV-171, a horizontal motion of the vertical stabilizer was noted during SSME 
ignition. Left wing motion was also noted at liftoff on the camera OTV-163 view. Slight 
body flap motion was seen on camera film E-207 after liftoff. Body flap, vertical 
stabilizer and wing motion has been seen on previous mission films. The magnitude of 
the motion seen on the STS-47 views was not sufficient to warrant further analysis. 
2.3.4	 Recirculation (Task #1) 
(Cameras ET-207, E-204, E-205, E-207) 
The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLY prior to SRB 
separation has been seen on nearly all the previous missions. For STS-47, the start of 
recirculation was observed at about 92 seconds MET and the end was noted at approximately 
105 seconds MET on Camera E-205. See Appendix D for a summary of recirculation start 
and stop times for all missions since reflight. 
CAMERA START (seconds MET) STOP (seconds MET) 
ET-207 92 99 
E-204 - - 
E-205 92 105 
E-207 91 99
NOTE:	 Intermittent LOV due to the SRB and SSME plumes prevented 
acquisition of specific start and stop times for recirculation on camera 
E.204. 
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2.3.5	 Orange and Dark Puffs in SRB Plume before SRB 
Separation 
(Cameras E-205, E-220, E-223, KTV4B, ET-207) 
A bright orange puff was noted in the SRB plume at approximately 114 seconds MET. 
No follow up action is expected. 
Figure 2.3.5	 Dark Puff in SSME Exhaust Plume 
A dark puff was noted in the SRB plume at approximately 116.6 seconds MET 
(immediately before plume brightening). No follow up action has been requested. 
2.3.6	 Linear Optical Effect 
(Cameras E-204, E-207, E-212, ET-207, E-208, KTV-13) 
Linear optical distortions were noted during ascent. On camera ET-207, the linear optical 
distortions were seen between 67.230 and 99.462 seconds MET. On KTV-13, the linear 
optical distortions were seen between 65.266 and 104.238 seconds MET. 
Linear optical effects have been seen on previous mission views. No follow up action has 
been requested. 
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2.4	 DTO-0312 Analysis 
2.4.1	 Analysis of Onboard Umbilical Well Photography (Task #5) 
2.4.1.1	 Debris/Chipping at SRB Separation 
Numerous pieces of small debris were seen in the 16 mm umbilical camera film view of 
the LSRB before, during, and after SRB separation. The debris appeared to be small 
pieces of TPS that had ablated off the external tank. Multiple divots and chipped areas 
were visible on the base of the electric cable tray on the umbilical well film. A large piece 
of TPS can be seen to detach from the electric cable tray approximately 1.8 seconds after 
SRB separation. A small unidentified dark piece of debris was seen in front of the LSRB 
just after separation. The aft ET/Orbiter attach brace and the ET aft dome show charring 
similar to that seen on previous mission umbilical films. The separation of the LSRB 
appeared normal. 
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2.4.1.2	 Metallic Appearing Object just prior to ET Separation 
(16mm Umbilical Well Camera with 5 mm lens) 
	
Figure 2.4.1.2	 Metallic Appearing Object seen just prior to ET 
Separation 
Upon screening film from the 16 mm camera located in the LH2 umbilical well, a metallic 
appearing object was observed passing from lower right to left through the field-of-view. 
The object has not yet been identified. The object is round and squatty in appearance with 
a hollow appearing center. Enhanced enlarged prints are being developed by the JSC/JL5 
Metric laboratory in order to better view this object. Image analysis and menstruation 
were performed to bound the size and velocity of the debris. 
The 16 mm camera is a fixed aperture camera with the focus set at infinity. The metallic 
appearing debris appeared to be slightly out of focus. If the debris was out of focus due 
to the object being within the hyper focal distance, an upper bound on the size of the 
object could be determined. At the hyper focal distance (625 mm), the outside diameter 
would be 1.07 inches, the inside diameter would be 0.52 inches and the height would be 
0.36 inches. If the debris was located between the camera and the ET the upper bound of 
the object would be 1.68 inches outside diameter, 0.81 inches inside diameter, and 0.57 
inches in height. If the debris was outside the ET, the size of the debris may not be 
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determined. The inside to outside diameter ratio was found to be 0.49 while the butside 
diameter to height ratio was 2.98. 
The minimum and maximum velocities, based on the object being within the hyper focal 
distance or at the hyper focal distance were found be 0.61 and 0.95 feet per second 
respectively. 
A cylindrical piece of debris was previously seen on the LH2 umbilical well camera film 
on STS-40 and was hypothesized to be a mating guide pin sleeve from the external tank 
umbilical area. The mating guide pin sleeve has an inside to outside diameter ratio of 0.76 
and an outside diameter to height ratio of 1.22 and compared favorably to the debris seen 
on STS-40 which had a diameter to height ratio of between 1.12 and 1.395. This does 
not, however, compare favorably with the ratios from the object seen on STS-47 (inside 
to outside diameter ratio of 0.49 and diameter to height ratio of 2.98). Based on these 
ratios it does not appear that the debris object from STS-47 is the mating guide pin sleeve 
or the same piece of debris seen on STS-40. 
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2.4.1.3	 Debris/Ice/TPS Blistering Seen in the ET Separation 
Sequence 
(lOnu'n Umbilical ¶%ell Camera with 5 mm lens) 
Figure 2.4.1.3	 Debris/Ice/TI'S Blistering Seen in the ET Separation 
Sequence 
White debris (probably ice) of various sizes and shapes were seen before, during, and 
after ET separation on the 16mm umbilical camera film (shown by arrow 1). On several 
occasions, white debris was seen to strike the ET electric cable tray prior to separation. 
No damage to the electric cable tray was noted. (Two pieces of metallic appearing debris 
visible on the 16mm umbilical film are described in the following two sections.) A 
blistered appearance to the TPS on the left side of the LH2 umbilical was visible as the ET 
began to move away from the Orbiter (see figure 2.4.1.4 arrow 2). Ice was visible in the 
orifice of the LH2 17 inch line as the LH2 umbilical came into full view (arrow 2). A 
white marking assumed to be ice was visible to the right of the LH2 umbilical on the 
ET/Orbiter horizontal attach brace (arrow 3). The view of the LH2 umbilical was 
reviewed with a lead JSC Propulsion and Power/EP2 and it was concluded that the 
bushing sleeves appeared to be present in their proper positions (the cylindrical shaped 
debris object seen on the STS-40 umbilical well film was believed to have been a 
dislodged bushing sleeve). 
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The events seen in the separation sequence of the external tank have been seen on previous 
mission umbilical well films with the exception of the metallic appearing debris objects. 
2.4.1.4	 Clip Shaped Debris at ET Separation 
(16,n,n Umbilical Well Camera with 5 mm lens) 
Figure 2.4.1.4	 Clip Shaped Debris at ET Separation 
A clip shaped object was seen on the film from the 16 mm hydrogen umbilical well 
camera with the 5mm lens at ET separation (arrow 1). The object first moved to the top of 
the frame, disappeared for 459 frames and then reappeared. The object then moved 
downward and disappeared from the FOV. MSFC pointed out that the object appeared to 
be within the camera housing. The film was rescreened and it was confirmed that indeed 
the object appeared to be within the camera housing, since the object was seen to pass 
between the camera lens and the edge of the camera housing. 
2.4.1.5	 Divots on ET 
(35mm Umbilical Well Camera and 70 mmHasselblad Camera) 
Divots were seen on or next to the close-out area between the ET intertank and the LH2 
tank extending from the Orbiter side of the ET (+Z) to the left (-Y) and right (±Y) horizons 
STS-47 Final Report
	
118	 ORIGINAL PAGE 
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
2.0	 Summary of Significant Events 
of the external tank. Several divots were seen near the forward FT/Orbiter attach bipod 
(arrow I). Shortly after the initial review of the films the divot(s) were declared an 
inflight anomaly (IFA) by the manager of the JSC Space Shuttle Engineering Integration 
Office. Divots have been seen near the forward ET/Orbiter attach bipod, along the 
intertank close-out, and on the intertank TPS on previous mission films. Since reflight, 
divots in these same regions were reported seen on STS-28R, STS-29R, STS-32R, STS-
41R, STS-35, STS-37, STS-40, STS-42, and STS-45 (Reference JSC Space Shuttle 
Photographic and Television Analysis Project Mission Final Reports). Similar divots 
were also seen on films from several missions prior to reflight including STS-51F, STS-
61A and STS-61C. 
Figure 2.4.1.5a Divots near Forward ET/Orbiter Attach Bipod (from 
the 35 mm Umbilical Well Camera) 
Measurements were made of the large divot visible between the legs of the forward bipod 
located partially on the intertank close-out and partially on the ET intertank TPS using the 
35mm umbilical well camera film (Mag 55). The divot measured 0.65 mm x 0.60 mm on 
the film. Using the known distance between the forward bipod legs of 85.5 30 inches, the 
divot was scaled to be 16.35 x 15.09 inches in size. Some shadow is visible inside the 
divot indicating depth. Under stereoscopic examination, the divot also appeared to have 
detectable depth. A second divot near the left leg of the forward bipod was measured to 
be 0.25 mm x 0.25 mm or 6.29 inches in size. 
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A third divot to the left along the -Y axis on the intertanklLH2 close-out was measured to 
be 0.25 x 0.4 mm or 6.29 x 10.06 inches in size on the 35 mm film. 
Figure 2.4.1.51)	 Divots seen on ET Intertank (70 mm Handheld 
Hasseiblad Film, Frame STS-47-71-006) 
The two divots visible on the intertank close-out and TPS shown on the handheld 
Hasselbiad photograph above taken by astronaut Mark Lee were measured to be 
approximately 14 inches (left) and 13 1/2 inches (right) in size along their major axis. 
OFiG AL 
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2.4.1.6	 Marking near L02 Umbilical Pressurization Line 
(Orifice) 
(35,n,n Umbilical Well Camera 
Figure 2.4.1.6	 Marking near L02 Umbilical Pressurization Line 
(Orifice) 
(35mm Umbilical Well Camera with mm lens) 
A unusual white demarcation and some missing or covered over red border material is 
visible near the L02 umbilical pressurization line orifice on the umbilical well 35 mm 
photograph shown above (arrow 1), this is the same pressurization point where KSC 
trouble shot a leak prior to flight. KSC stated that the white demarcation is a streaking of 
RTV caused by the repair to the leak in the pressurization line prior to flight. The image of 
the demarcation was reviewed with a JSC Propulsion Systems EngineerfEP2 who also 
believed that the marking and gap in the red border material were a known result of the 
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prelaunch pressure testing. Previous mission umbilical well films have been reviewed and 
no similar markings were found. No follow up photographic analysis is expected. 
2.4.1.7	 Possible Loose Insulation above L02 Umbilical 
(35mm Umbilical Well Camera) 
A light colored demarcation is visible directly forward of the L02 umbilical on the 35 mm 
umbilical well camera film. See figure 2.4.1.6 (arrow 2). The marking appears to be on 
or laying across the station 2058.0 cross beam. The marking is somewhat triangular in 
shape and measured approximately 4.8 inches across its longest dimension. This marking 
could be a loose piece of insulation from the umbilical well. The marking appears similar 
to the loose insulation from the L02 umbilical well previously seen on STS-28R 
umbilical well photography. This event was reviewed with a JSC Propulsion and Power 
Division engineer. No follow up photographic analysis has been requested. 
2.4.2	 Onboard Hasselbiad ET Analysis (Task #6) 
(Frames STS-47-71 -003 through STS -4 7-0 73) 
Seventy excellent quality photographs of the external tank were taken by astronaut Mark 
Lee shortly after ET separation. (See figure 2.4.1 .5b for an example of the photography) 
Method 2 of DTO-312 uses the 70 mm format Hasseiblad camera with a 250 mm lens. 
This was the first flight using the Fuji Velvia 50 color positive film for recording the 
condition of the external tank. The first picture was taken at 14:36:33 UTC or four 
minutes and forty seconds after ET separation. The distance of the external tank from the 
orbiter as measured from the first picture (frame 3) was calculated to be 1,018.3 meters. 
The last picture was taken at 14:45:46 UTC or thirteen minutes and fifty three seconds 
after ET separation. The distance of the external tank from the orbiter as measured from 
the last picture (frame 73) was calculated to be 3,862.86 meters. The separation velocity 
between the Orbiter and the external tank between the time of the first picture and the last 
picture was calculated to be 5.14 meters per second. All aspects of the external tank were 
photographed. Back lighting caused much of the ET surface to be in shadow after the 
twelfth picture. The tank tumbled from a nose down to a nose up attitude (around the Y 
axis) in 4 minutes showing the left and right side of the ET. The rotation about the X axis 
was very slight. 
Divots were seen on the ET -Y axis on the intertank/LH2 closeout (see section 2.4.1.5). 
Other than the intertank closeout divots, the overall condition of the external tank TPS 
appeared to be in good condition. The ET aft dome showed the typical charring from the 
ascent heating. The left and right SRB separation burn scars are very apparent on the 
photography. The burn scars appeared similar to previous mission handheld views. The 
burn scars did not show conclusive evidence of indications of burning through to bare metal. 
2.5	 Landing Events 
2.5.1	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis (Task #3) 
2.5.1.1	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Film

(Cameras EL-9, EL-12) 
Camera EL-9 film was used to determine the sink rate of the main gear. The left inboard tire was 
used to scale the measurements. Data was gathered from 1.068 seconds prior to landing through 
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touchdown. Three points on every other frame over a period of 100 frames were digitized. 
These points consisted of the top and bottom of the right tire and a point on the runway 
immediately beneath the wheel. This raw data was corrected for the vertical change in scale at 
each frame. The distance between the bottom of the wheel and the runway was computed and a 
linear regression was applied on this normalized vertical distance vs. time data to find the actual 
sink rate. This rate was determined to be 0.8 ft/sec. which is well within the current threshold 
limits. 
Nose gear touchdown occurred approximately 17 seconds after main gear touchdown. Camera 
EL- 12 was used to determine the nose gear sink rate. The nose wheel itself was used to scale the 
measurements. Data was gathered for the 1.595 seconds prior to nose gear touchdown. Three 
points on every other frame over a period of 76 frames were digitized. These points consisted of 
the top and bottom of the nose wheel and a point on the runway surface immediately beneath the 
nose gear. This raw data was corrected for the vertical change in scale at each frame. The 
distance between the bottom of the wheel and the runway was computed and a linear regression 
was applied on this normalized vertical distance vs. time data to find the actual sink rate. This rate 
was determined to be 1.4 ft/sec. which is also well within the current threshold limits. 
Graphs depicting the above data can be seen in Task #3 Appendix D. 
2.5.1.2	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Video 
(Camera KTV-33) 
Sink rate was calculated for the main gear of the vehicle using a single camera solution. 
Positional information was acquired by digitizing the landing sequence and then obtaining a 
screen dump of cursor positions at the points of interest. The positional information was then 
scaled to actual position and a linear least squares line was fitted through these points as a 
function of time. The main gear sink rate was calculated to be 1.32 feet per second. A sink 
rate plot is located in Appendix D Task 3. No follow-up action has been requested. See 
Appendix D Task #3 for details. 
Results from the film analysis are considered better than video because of the higher spatial 
resolution. 
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2.5.2	 Damage to Base of Vertical Stabilizer 
Figure 2.5.2	 Damage to Base of Vertical Stabilizer seen at 
Post Landing Inspection 
Damage was noted to the tiles at the base of the left side of the vertical stabilizer near the 
drag chute door. No follow up action was requested. 
2.5.3	 Drag Chute Performance (Task #9) 
The landing of Endeavour at the end of mission STS-47 marked the third deployment of 
the Orbiter drag chute. All components of the drag chute appeared to deploy as expected. 
Several tasks were worked in support of the drag chute. A 2-D plot of the drag chute 
components at deploy was created using video from camera TV- 11 (see 2.5.3a). The 
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relative position of the Orbiter as a function of time was calculated to support the analysis 
of the effect of the drag chute on the vehicle's velocity. Also, the angles of the drag chute 
with respect to the Orbiter as a function of time were calculated to support the 
improvement of the aerodynamic math models currently in use. 
Relative positional data of selected points on the vehicle and the center of the drag chute 
were collected from landing cameras EL-7 and EL-9 which were located on the center line 
of the either end of the runway. The rate at which the film was sampled was 
approximately 50 frames per second for approximately 13 seconds. Timing information 
was determined for each frame measured, and angular field-of-view calibrations were 
performed for each camera. All analysis was performed on each camera individually, and 
the independent results used for verification purposes. By using the relative position of 
the vertical stabilizer with respect to the wings and main gear, the orientation of the Orbiter 
could be determined relative to each camera. This relative orientation information was 
taken into account during the Orbiter position calculations and the drag chute angle 
calculations as well. 
The positional analysis was performed from the EL-7 and EL-9 data based on the size of 
the vehicle projected onto the film. The output from these calculations was the distance of 
the vehicle from each camera as a function of time. (See Figure 2.5.3b). 
The changes in the drag chute heading and riser angles with respect to time were 
determined and are presented in Figure 2.5.3c. The Heading angle is defined as the angle 
between the drag chute centerline and the Orbiter XZ plane. The Riser angle is defined as 
the angle between the drag chute centerline and the Orbiter XY plane. 
STS-47 Final Report	 - --
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events 
STS-47 DRAG CHUTE COMPONENT TRAJECTORIES 
Figure 2.5.3a	 2D Plot of Drag Chute Components at Deploy from 
Camera TV-11 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events 
Rollout Positions versus Time 
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Figure 2.5.3b
	 Distance of Endeavour from Camera EL-7 as a 
Function of Time 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events 
EL9 Riser and Heading Angles versus Time 
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Figure 2.5.3c
	 Change in Drag Chute Riser & Heading Angles 
with respect to Time (Gaps in the data are caused by 
visual obstructions) 
2.6	 Other Normal Events 
Other events seen on the STS-47 launch views that have been seen on previous shuttle 
flights include: smoke from the hydrogen ignitors during startup; RCS paper in SSME 
plume at startup; frost buildup around the umbilical baggie area and the ET vent louvers; 
normal pad debris; butcher paper debris from the RCS ports; multiple pieces of MLP 
debris in the exhaust plume after liftoff; ET aft dome outgassing; vapor from both SRB 
stiffener rings; acoustic waves during liftoff; RCS paper and normal debris seen during 
roll maneuver, overshoot of the roll maneuver, RCS paper debris in the SSME plume after 
roll maneuver, expansion waves after roll maneuver, slight charring of the ET aft dome; 
flares in SRB plume; condensation around the SLV; SRB exhaust plume brightening at tail 
off; and slag noted after SRB separation. 
STS-47 Final Report
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I.	 INTRODUCTION 
Space Shuttle Mission STS-47, the second flight of the 
Orbiter Endeavour was conducted September 12, 1992 at 
approximately 9:23 A.M. Central Daylight Time from Launch Complex 
39B (LC-39A), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. Extensive 
photographic and video coverage was provided and has been 
evaluated to determine proper operation of the ground and flight 
hardware. Cameras (video and cine) providing this coverage are 
located on the fixed service structure (FSS), mobile launch 
platform (MLP), LC-39B perimeter sites, onboard, and uprange and 
downrange tracking sites. 
II. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES: 
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis 
objectives for STS-47 included, but were not limited to the 
following.
a. Overall facility and Shuttle vehicle coverage for 
anomaly detection 
b. Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems 
c. Determination of SRB PlC firing time and SRB 
separation time 
d. Verification of Thermal Protection System (TPS) 
integrity 
e. Correct operation of the following: 
1. Holddown post blast covers 
2. SSME ignition 
3. LH2 and L02 17" disconnects 
4. GH2 umbilical 
5. TSM carrier plate umbilicals 
6. Free hydrogen ignitors 
7. Vehicle clearances 
8. GH2 vent line retraction and latch back 
9. Vehicle motion 
There was one special test objective for this mission. 
a. DTO-0312, ET photography after separation 
III. CAMERA COVERAGE ASSESSMENT: 
Film was received from fifty-eight of fifty-eight requested 
cameras as well as video from twenty-four of twenty-four 
requested cameras. The following table illustrates the camera 
data received at MSFC for STS-47. 
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CAMERA DATA RECEIVED FOR STS-47 
16mm 35mm 70mm Video 
MLP 24 0 0 4 
FSS 7 0 0 3 
Perimeter 3 3 0 6 
Tracking 0 16 0 11 
Onboard 3 1 1 0
Totals	 37	 20	 1	 24 
A detailed individual motion picture camera assessment is 
provided as Appendix B. Appendix C contains detailed assessments 
of the video products received at MSFC. 
a. Ground Camera Coverage: 
Photographic coverage of STS-47 was considered good. 
Coverage from the trackers was limited due to haze and cloud 
coverage. Camera E-8 timing block is dark but readable. On 
camera E-16 the field of view is bad and the timing information 
block is erratic. Camera E-34 the timing is suspect. Cameras 
E-52 and E-220 experienced some camera jitter. 
b. Onboard Camera Assessment: 
A camera was flown on each SRB forward skirt to record the 
main parachute deployment. Both cameras operated properly. 
However, camera E-301 did not record water impact. Also, the 
astronauts carried a 70mm hand-held camera to record film for 
evaluating the ET TPS integrity after ET separation. One 16mm 
motion picture camera and one 35mm still camera were flown on 
this mission in the Orbiter's umbilical well to record the SRB 
and ET separation events. 
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS: 
a. General Observations: 
While viewing the film, several events were noted which 
occur on most missions. These included: pad debris rising and 
falling as the vehicle lifts off; debris induced streaks in the 
SSME plume; ice falling from the 17" disconnect and umbilicals 
and debris particles falling aft of the vehicle during ascent, 
which consist of RCS motor covers, hydrogen fire detectors, purge 
barrier material and SRB thermal curtain tape. 
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b. ET rPS Divots: 
Seventy-three film frames were captured of the external 
tank. Figure one is a film frame showing two divots noted at LH2 
intertank scarf joint (-Y +Z quadrant) and one large divot 
between the bipod strut. An analysis was performed on the large 
divot by overlaying the 3-D CAD geometry on the image. This 
divot is approximately 17 x 21 inches with an area approximately 
350 sq. inches. 
V.	 ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS: 
a. T-Zero Times: 
T-Zero times were determined from cameras which view the 
SRB hoiddown posts numbers N-i, M-2, M-5 and M-6. These cameras 
record the explosive bolt combustion products. 
POST	 CAMERA POSITION
N-i E-9 
N-2 E-8 
M-5 E-12 
M-6 E-i3
TIME (tJTC) 
256:14:23:00.018 
256:14;23:00.019 
256:14:23:00.018 
256:14:23:00.017 
b. ET Tip Deflection: 
Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was determined 
to be approximately 31.8 inches. Figure two is a data plot 
showing the measured motion of the ET tip in both the horizontal 
and vertical directions. These data were derived from camera 
E-79.
C. SRB Separation Time: 
SRB separation time for STS-47 was determined to be 
256:14:25:04.13 UTC taken from camera E-207. 
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Space Transportation Systems Division 
Rockwell International Corporation

12214 Lakewood Boulevard

Downey. California 90241 
August 19, 1992
Rockwell. 
International 
In Reply Refer to 92MA3490 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
Houston, Texas 77058 
Attention: L. G. Williams (WA) 
Contract NAS9-18500, System Integration, Transmittal of the Rockwell 
Engineering Photographic Analysis Report for the STS-50 Mission. 
The System Integration Contractor hereby submits the Engineering 
Photographic Analysis Summary Report in accordance with the Space Shuttle 
Program Launch and Landing Photographic Engineering Evaluation Document 
(NSTS 08244). 
Extensive photographic and video coverage was provided and has been evaluated 
to determine ground and flight performance. Cameras (cine and video) 
providing this coverage are located on the Launch Complex 39A Fixed Service 
Structure (FSS), Mobile Launch Platform (MU'), various perimeter sites, and 
uprange and downrange tracking sites for the STS-50 launch conducted on 
June 25, 1992, at approximately 9:12 AM (PDT) from the Kennedy Space Center 
(KSC) and for the landing on July 9, 1992 at KSC (4:43 AM PDT). 
Rockwell received launch films from 84 cameras (61 cine, 23 video) and landing 
films from 18 cameras (11 cine, 7 video) to support the STS-50 photographic 
evaluation effort. Two films, E-57 and E-77, were not available due to camera 
malfunctions. 
All ground camera coverage for this mission including coverage on the ML?, 
FSS and tracking cameras were good. However, due to the accumulation of 
clouds, many of the tracking video and films reviewed were obstructed after the 
vehicle went through the cloud cover. This hampered analysis and possible 
detection of debris and/or anomalies. 
Overall, the films showed STS-50 to be a clean flight. Several pieces of ice from 
the ET/ORB umbilicals were shaken loose at SSME ignition, but no damage to 
the Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS) was apparent. The usual 
condensation and water vapors were seen at the ET aft dome and the SRB 
stiffener rings and dissipated after the completion of the roll maneuver. No 
vapor was observed in the vicinity of the rudder/speed brake at liftoff. Charring 
of the ET aft dome and recirculation were not visible due to heavy cloud cover. 
Booster Separation Motor (BSM) firing and SRB separation appeared normal but 
could only be verified by one camera due to the cloud cover. 
(Packing Sheet No. DM92-17888)
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A disturbance in the lateral acceleration strip chart data at liftoff led Rockwell 
Engineers (Ascent Separation Systems) to suspect there had been a bolt hang-up 
on one of the SRB hoiddown support posts. This assumption was confirmed 
when films E-7 and E-10 were reviewed which clearly showed the post M-4 bolt to 
hang-up at liftoff. The bolt also deflected during liftoff until the aft skirt foot rose 
sufficiently to release it, causing the bolt to spring back to its original vertical 
position. 
Nominal performance was seen for the MLP and FSS hardware. FSS deluge 
water was activated prior to SSME ignition and the MLP rainbirds were 
activated at approximately 1 second Mission Elapsed Time (MET), as is normal. 
All blast deflection shields closed prior to direct SRB exhaust plume 
impingement. Both TSM umbilicals released and retracted as designed. The ET 
GH2 vent line carrier dropped normally and latched securely with no rebound. 
No anomalies were identified with the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical hydrogen 
dispersal system hardware. 
STS-50 was the eigth flight with the optimized attach link in the SRB hoiddown 
support post Debris Containment Systems (DCS's). The link is designed to 
increase the plunger velocity and seating accuracy, while leaving the hoiddown 
bolt ejection velocity unchanged. This prevents frangible nut fragments and/or 
NSI cartridges from falling from the DCS, while not increasing the probability of 
a holddown bolt hang-up. Significant events that were seen include a bolt hang-
up at holddown post M-4 of the right SRB at liftoff and a dark piece of flexible 
debris which originated from the right SRB flame duct and moved north away 
from the vehicle. These events and other events noted by the Rockwell film/video 
users during the review and analysis of the STS-50 photographic items are 
summarized in the following comments. These events are not considered to be a 
constraint to next flight. 
COMMENTS 
1. A hangup of the holddown post M-4 holddown bolt on the SRB was seen at 
liftoff on cameras E-7 and E-10. Rockwell/Downey engineers had previously 
reported a disturbance in the lateral acceleration strip chart data at liftoff 
which led them to expect a possible hoiddown post bolt hangup. This event 
was clearly seen in the photographic review as the M-4 hoiddown bolt rose a 
significant amount during liftoff before breaking away from the SRB and 
springing back into position. No further analysis is planned. 
2. On Camera E-7 a large piece of EPON shim material debounded from the 
hoiddown post M-4 aft skirt foot and fell into the flame duct during liftoff. 
This is probably caused by the M-4 bolt hangup. No further analysis is 
planned. 
3. Orange vapor (possibly free burning hydrogen) was seen below the SSME's just prior to SSME ignition on cameras E-3, E-5, E-15, E-17, E-18, E-19, E-20, 
E-23, E-62, E-63, E-76 and beneath the body flap (moving north) on camera's 
OTV-063, OTV-070, and E-30. This vapor appears to be similar to the vapor 
noted on previous missions. It is not an issue and no follow-up action is 
planned.
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4. Flexing (an up and down motion) was noted in the base heat shield in the 
centerline area between the SSME duster during the early stage of SSME 
ignition. Base heat shield movement has occurred on previous missions 
and no follow-up action is planned. 
5. On cameras El, E4 & E15 a large piece of flexible debris originated from the 
RSRB flame trench shortly after SRB ignition. Does not appear to strike 
vehicle. No further analysis planned. 
6. On camera E-1 8, Two pieces of debris (origin unknown) fall aft from above 
the left inboard elevon prior to liftoff. Does not appear to strike vehicle. 
7. Orange flares and flashes seen in the SSME plumes (E2, E3, E52, E213, E222, 
E223). These observations are seen frequently and are understood to be 
burning of propellant impurities including RCS paper covers. No follow-up 
action is planned. 
8. During the screening of the 16mm and 35mm umbilical well camera films 
an apparent rectangular shaped divot was seen on the LH2iintertank flange 
at the base of the left leg of the forward ET/Orbiter attach bipod. The forward 
bipod is in the standup position. Several small divots or chipping of the TPS 
was seen near the L02 feed line, L02 umbilical and the forward ET/Orbiter 
attach. Blow-ups of the ET 16mm & 35mm film is underway and analysis is 
in progress. 
9. The following events have been reported on previous missions and observed 
on STS-50. These are not of major concern, but are documented here for 
information only: 
• • Ice debris falling from the ET/Orbiter Umbilical disconnect area. 
• Debris (Pad, insta-foam, water trough) in the holddown post areas 
and MLP. 
• Butcher paper failing from the RCS. 
Recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV 
prior to SRB separation. 
• Slight TPS erosion on the base heat shield during SSME start-up. 
• Shock waves visible on the pad at SSME startup. 
• Debris pieces in the SSME/SRB plumes. 
• Condensation around the SLV after the roll maneuver. 
• ET aft dome outgassing and charring. 
10. Cameras E33 and E41 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. DV08P.010 
requires an analysis of launch pad film data to verify that the initial ascent 
clearance separation between the left SRB outer mold line and the falling ET 
vent umbilical structure does not violate the acceptable margin of safety. 
A qualitative assessment has been conducted and positive clearances 
between the left SRB and the ET vent umbilical have been verified. The films 
showed nominal launch pad hardware performance, and no anomalies 
were observed for the SRB body trajectory. 
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11. Cameras E7-16 and E27-E28 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. 
DV08P.020 requires an analysis of film data of SRM nozzle during liftoff to 
verify nozzle to hoiddown post drift clearance. 
A qualitative assessment of the launch films has been completed. No 
anomalies were observed for the SRM nozzle trajectory and positive 
clearances between the SRB nozzles and the hoiddown posts were verified. 
12. The landing of STS-50 occurred on runway 33 at the KSC Shuttle landing 
facility. Good video and film coverage of the drag chute deploy was obtained. 
The drag parachute system performed as expected. All sequenced events 
occurred as planned and no hardware anomalies were observed. 
Analysis continues in the areas of compartment door trajectory, reeled main 
chute operation, and riser position relative to the Orbiter stinger. The 
results of this analysis will be used to validate models against actual flight 
data, and to allow accurate predictions for future flights. 
This letter is of particular interest to W. J. Gaylor (VF2) and J. M. Stearns 
(WE3) at JSC. The Integration Contractor contacts are 
R Ramon at (310) 922-3679 or C. I. Miyashiro at (310) 922-0214. 
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL 
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